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between landless Paraguayans and powerful Brazilian landowners have cast an unprecedented spotlight on Brasiguaios.
3 Rather than focusing on the dynamics of these recent conflicts, this essay seeks to examine the origins of Brasiguaio immigration in order to understand the characteristics and contradictions that have redefined the Brazil-Paraguay border. In doing so, I
will argue that the actions and contexts of both nations set in motion the transformation of the space between them, a process that was profoundly shaped by the role of Brasiguaios.
Brasiguaio immigration was the product of the military regimes of Brazil and Paraguay.
The ambitions of both governments met at their shared frontier along the Alto Paraná borderlands, a region where small-scale farmers were initially deployed in order to clear and settle Paraguayan lands, only to then be discarded when monopolies of Brazilian agriculturalists were eventually established. The evolution of a Brazilian presence in Paraguay can be attributed to three distinct-yet highly connected-processes. The first was the unveiling of national development goals where each dictatorship prioritized industrialization and territorial expansion. On the heels of the Itaipu Dam, the third and final process that determined the evolution of Brasiguaio enclaves was the mechanization of agriculture. Once a significant number of small-scale Brazilian farmers had established a presence in eastern Paraguay, the military regimes of both countries encouraged new forms of industrial agriculture. Above all, this meant the production of soybeans, a crop that required a relatively minimal workforce and led to the complete reorientation of land relations along the border. As soy grew in importance, land became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a new rural elite and small-farmers were displaced and exploited at an alarming rate. 4 That these agricultural oligarchies were comprised almost exclusively of Brazilians indicates the complex dynamics of Brasiguaio immigration:
Brazilians living in Paraguay wound up being expelled by their own countrymen.
In seeking to understand the impacts of Brasiguaio immigration, this paper will lean on the perspectives of borderlands theory. Such an approach allows us to look beyond the existence of borders as political constructs and to focus instead on the historical effects of borderlands, above all on how the social dynamics of border regions affect the formation and territorialization of states and communities. Whereas the literature on frontiers and borders initially came about in the context of the U.S. West from scholars like Frederick Jackson Turner and Herbert Eugene Bolton, in recent years the field of borderlands studies has become highly innovative and employed to interpret regions throughout the world. (Weber 1986 , Adelman and Aron 1999 , Hämäläinen and Truett, 2011 ) As Cañizares-Esguerra (2007 has shown, these theories have been especially useful in examining Latin America, where the concept of borders is deeply rooted in the realities of colonial history. However, scholarship on Latin American borderlands has tended to focus primarily on the U.S.-Mexico border (Weber 2009 , Johnson 2010 , St. John 2011 and as such, the present article will intervene by extending the conceptual framework of this literature further down to the Southern Cone.
In their seminal study of borderlands, Baud and Schendel (1997, 216) wrote that 'borders create political, social, and cultural distinctions, but simultaneously imply the existence of (new) networks and systems of interactions across them.' So rather than analyzing the Brasiguaios through the rhetoric and intentions of central governments, we are better able to concentrate on the social realities provoked by them. In the case of Brasiguaios, these social realities are productions of the ways in which the Alto Paraná borderlands have been completely transformed in the span of only a few generations. Because of the policies and development goals of Brazil and Paraguay's military regimes, the political border between them has essentially dissolved, leaving in its place a re-imagined frontier where class conflict and access to land have replaced nationality as the primary determinants of social hierarchy.
Scholarship on Brasiguaio immigration first emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as authors like Domingo Laino (1977) , J.M.G. Kleinpenning (1987) , and Alfredo da Mota Menezes (1990) argued that the abusive policies of the Stroessner regime were at fault for the dire conditions facing Paraguayan farmers. Following these initial studies, foreign economists like Andrew Nickson (1981 Nickson ( , 1988 and Beverly Nagel (1991 Nagel ( , 1999 examined the transformation of Paraguay's eastern border region and traced the emergent soybean enclaves to the presence of Brazilian immigration and the mechanization of agriculture. As the soybean industry came to dominant Paraguay's economy by the late 1990s, a new movement of scholar-activists, led by the Paraguayan sociologist Ramón Fogel, dedicated themselves to revealing the destructive nature of the industry and the abuse of their countrymen. (Fogel 1990) In response to these harsh criticisms, a sustained debate emerged that explored the characteristics of Brasiguaio communities in order to nuance their image as homogenous usurpers of Paraguayan lands. (Wagner 1990 , Cortês 1994 , Feliú 2004 , Menegotto 2004 , Albuquerque 2010 ) Although this recent scholarship has correctly softened the dichotomy between nationalities, it has failed to sufficiently acknowledge the dominant power relations both among the wide spectrum of Brazilian farmers, and between the administrations of Brazil and Paraguay. As such, the present article will intervene in the existing literature by looking less at the geopolitics between countries, and more at how inequalities formed in the borderlands as a by-product of their development policies and practices.
Although they are associated with wealthy landowners, the historical construction of the phrase "Brasiguaio" reveals its deeper complexity. Paraguayans, men without a country.' (Wagner 1990, 11) The notion of being men without a country is at the heart of understanding the history of Most of these Brazilians were peasant farmers, were the notable exception of Geremías Lunardelli, a Brazilian coffee baron who in the 1950s came to own more than one million hectares of subtropical forest lands in eastern Paraguay thanks to an initial 1952 land grant of 540,000 hectares given personally by Stroessner. (Kohlhepp 1999, 206; and Cortêz 1994, 17) . I came to Paraguay because my property along the Paraná River was flooded; when Itaipu was constructed all of our lands were flooded. And since we were a large family, we were left with very little since the price that they paid us was not equivalent to the real value of the land, but rather to their own estimations… Since we had little money and the land [in Paraguay] was cheap and had lots of timber, we decided to leave for Paraguay. (Albuquerque 2010, 67) Having recently gained access to the fertile lands of eastern Paraguay, the Brazilian government actively encouraged its citizens to move across the border. Propaganda was broadcast in southern Brazil in newspapers and radio stations encouraging settlement in Paraguay, proclaiming that lands were very cheap and could quickly improve their lives. Land was, in fact, much cheaper and could be bought anywhere from 1/6 to 1/10 of the price compared to Brazil. 9 With funding from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, Paraguay's government instituted credit and tax programs in the border region that proved very favorable to Brazilians. The credit rates made available in eastern Paraguay were far better than those in Brazil, with the added bonus of zero income tax and a minimal land tax that was rarely enforced. Whereas all farmers-regardless of nationality-enjoyed these credit and tax policies, Brazilians in particular benefitted from another critical initiative: there was no export tax. This essentially meant that all production on Paraguayan lands could flow freely back to Brazil.
This first wave of Brazilian immigrants were not able to get citizenship across the border but they were motivated by the promise that their children, if born on Paraguayan land, would be Paraguayan citizens. Brazil, for its part, granted citizenship to children born in foreign nations if one of their parents 'were in the service of the nation,' leading Brazilian immigrants to think that their family would eventually have access to dual citizenship and political rights in both countries. 10 Smallholders in Brazil became very receptive to their government's publicity campaign to move across the border and, having been kicked off their lands, began to see
Paraguay as a land of opportunity. As Kohlhepp (1999, 210) observes, for small landholders who had been expelled from Paraná, migration to eastern Paraguay did not only offer the prospect of higher quality lands; it included 'the added allure of social mobility in a nascent border community.'
Take, for example, the case of one Brazilian peasant who in 1977 relocated to Paraguay.
After selling his 17.5-hectare plot of land to the Itaipu Binational Corporation for 520,000
9 Kohlhepp (1999, 209) offers the 1/6 cost estimation, while Kleinpenning (1987, 178) quotes the price as 1/10 compared to Brazil. 10 (Albuquerque 2010, 209-210) cruzeiros, he moved to Paraguay and bought 75 hectares for only 230,000. With the money remaining from the sale of his original lands, he was able to build a house, plant 25 hectares of soybeans and still had a bit left over to buy a tractor the following year. (Menezes 199, 137) Stories such as these most assuredly spread through rural Brazil and motivated thousands of farmers to seek new opportunities in Paraguay, causing the number of Brasiguaio settlers to increase dramatically. As late as 1969 there had been fewer than 11,000 Brazilians living in eastern Paraguay, yet less than a decade later that figure jumped to nearly 150,000. By 1983, over 360,000 Brazilians made their home in eastern Paraguay, marking the true emergence of Brasiguaio colonization. (Kohlhepp 1999, 208) 
Brasiguaios and the Military Regimes
If the pattern of Brasiguayo settlement would seem to favor the development of the Brazilian state, why then was Paraguay so willing to allow-and even encourage-the settlement of its lands by foreigners? To answer this question, it is necessary to first discuss the evolution of Paraguayan politics over the previous decade.
In 1963 the Paraguayan state created the Institute for Rural Wellbeing (IBR) and the Agrarian Statute, two entities that indicate the extent to which foreign settlement was being used as a primary development strategy. 11 The IBR was charged with the distribution and development of state-owned lands, with the official aim of incorporating Paraguay's peasant population into the nation's economic development. In name, at least, the IBR was conceived as 11 Along with the IBR, another key mechanism of settlement were the private commercial enterprises known as colonizadoras that advertised on both sides of the border and oversaw the financial transactions with settler farmers. 14 Furthermore, Kleinpenning (1987, 181) points out that, 'although this ruling had often been circumnavigated before then, its abolition meant that land could now be sold openly and legally.' In response to a question about Paraguay's lifting of property restrictions for foreigners on land near the border, Alberto 12 (Menegotto 2004, 41) . For example, one of the laws passed created by the IBR required that at least 20% of a local settlement population must be Paraguayan. Despite this new law, multiple examples were cited in the border regions of Alto Paraná and Canindeyú where Brazilians represented well over 80% of the inhabitants, despite being in clear violation of the law. (Kohlhepp 1999, 217) 13 (Fogel 1990, 51) 14 (Kohlhepp 199, 206) Fernandez, a captain in the Paraguayan army and director of a private land settlement company, proclaimed: 'We're simply doing what Brazil already did when it stimulated the arrival of Italian, German, and Japanese settlers to its country.'
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The distribution of land in Paraguay's eastern border region followed a pattern of hierarchy and corruption that overtly privileged Brazilian settlers at the expense of Paraguayan peasants. Under the auspices of the IBR in the mid 1960s, the Paraguayan government sold off the state-owned lands to high-ranking officials and politicians, who frequently auctioned them off to Brazilian colonists. 16 Corruption was especially rampant in the early years of the border's colonization, as dishonest bureaucrats were given privileged government jobs in charge of land speculation and distribution. Feliú (2004, 47 ) cites a contemporary report proclaiming that 'those in charge of controlling and taxing the area quickly became millionaires, or basically that instead of actually administering, all the officials charged taxes however they pleased without drawing up any legal documents.' These processes mimic Baud and Schendel's observation (1997, 217) that 'When borderland elites were well integrated into networks of state power, they could become important allies of the state in its efforts to control borderland society.' In this manner, the collusion of state and local elites created widespread bureaucratic corruption that exacerbated an already unequal form of land distribution throughout the border region. (Kleinpenning 1987, 179) . It should be noted that the term "corruption" has been the subject of recent debate, wherein some scholars have considered it as a category imported "from the North" that is superficially imposed on foreign cultures. For more, see: Haller & Shore, 2005. Its use in this article is intended to portray instances where government bureaucrats and military officials acted outside of the purview of their immediate responsibilities, practices that enriched themselves and their acquaintances and/or distributed land in ways that ran counter to the letter of the law. 17 For an analysis of why the Paraguayan government was willing to sell off its own land to Brazilians, see: (Kleinpenning 1987,180) . It is important to observe, however, that although the Stroessner government clearly advocated for and facilitated the import of Brazilian immigrants, this process was not solely the product of official state policies. Much of this history resulted from the actions of local elites, members of the military, and corrupt functionaries who capitalized on opportunities in a poorly-regulated environment.
The Evolving Dynamics of Brasiguaios
With a clear understanding of how-and why-the Paraguayan state encouraged Brazilian settlement, it is helpful now to concentrate more on the settlers themselves and attempt to understand the experiences and historical evolution of Brasiguaio communities. The initial wave of Brazilian immigrants to Paraguay was not defined by the powerful Brazilian magnates that would soon control the region, but rather by a steady stream of small-scale farmers pushed across the border by the Itaipu dam. For the most part, these early settlers belonged to two main groups. The first was comprised of poor immigrants from the Northeast of Brazil who worked as agricultural laborers, farmhands, or in the informal sector. The second was small-to mediumscale agriculturalists from the southern states of Paraná, Río Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.
For the most part, the agriculturalists in the latter group descended from German and Italian immigrants, transposing not only a class hierarchy in the new border settlements, but a racial one as well. Since these Euro-descendent Brazilians often brought with them capital and industrial tools, they immediately gained favor with the Stroessner regime and were able to rise quickly through the social ranks. (Fogel and Riquelme 2005, 124) The upward mobility of these southern
Brazilians is a stark contrast to the marginalized-and racialized-condition of both the poor Afro-Brazilians from the North East and the mostly indigenous and Guarani-speaking local Paraguayan peasants.
A passage from a 1971 article in the Brazilian magazine Veja speaks to the fragile position in which these initial immigrants arrived in Paraguay. Interestingly enough, the description also ends with a tinge of optimism, suggesting both that the immigrants themselves were hopeful of finding a better life, and that Brazilian society looked positively on the relocation of its own citizens to a neighboring country. Veja, March 3, 1971, 34. 19 (Fogel and Riquelme 2005, 126) . It is necessary to note that Paraguayan smallholders confronted similar problems, underscoring the fact that land bureaucracies exploited farmers regardless of their nationality. Moreover, the illegality and pervasiveness of these processes suggest the extent to which local practices in the border region developed independently of official state policy. For more on Paraguayan smallholders and the problems of land titles, see: Souchaud and Carámbula 2007. Brasiguaios must be interpreted as a form of agricultural shock troops. Simply put, they were mobilized and exploited so that lands would be cleared, farms would be settled, and a base would be established from which larger development and industry could take root.
One of the more tangible measures of the borderlands' reconfiguration is through an examination of the deforestation that was necessary to clear fields for cultivation of Brasiguaiocontrolled lands. Since the development of these new agricultural sectors necessitated open lands for cultivation, the first major Brazilian-led commercial activity along the Paraguayan border was in the logging and cutting down of trees for export. Menezes (1990, 211) These patterns formed a vicious cycle in the development and reorientation of eastern Paraguay. As more small-scale Brasiguaios settled in Paraguay, their presence pushed out local farmers whose subsequent mobilizations were used by the government as a pretext to further appropriate peasant lands. That these territories were increasingly auctioned off to wealthy Brazilian serves as a striking arc in this narrative of an unequal borderland.
This was also the period when small-scale and diversified subsistence farming was replaced by soybean production. Between 1972 Between -1977 , the area under cultivation in Paraguay rose at an annual rate of 16%, of which 25% was dedicated exclusively to soybean agriculture. (Menezes 1990, 14) Soy first appeared in Paraguayan agricultural censuses in the 1970s, and its production expanded such that within 30 years Paraguay became the world's sixth largest producer of soybeans-a significant indicator for a country with fewer than seven million inhabitants. The cultivation of soybeans became so central to the Paraguayan economy that by 2004, the crop occupied nearly two million hectares-over fifty percent of all cultivated lands in the country. (Albuquerque 2010, 83) 20 (Riquelme 2005, 136) . It should also be noted that opposition to Brazilian settlers also came from established political structures in Paraguay. In 1972 and 1974 , leaders from the oppositional parties of Partido Liberal Radical Autentico (PLRA) and the Partido Febrista attempted to institute a law prohibiting the sale of land to foreigners along the border. These were some of the first institutional reactions against the 1963 Agrarian Statute that had originally legalized the sale of land to foreigners and specifically favored Brazilians. (Albuquerque 2010, 118) Unlike previous crops grown in the borderlands, soybean agriculture required relatively low amounts of labor, meaning that the impact of soy cultivation on poverty was mediated Souchaud (2005,19 ) the three biggest soy-producing regions in Paraguay became Alto Paraná, Itapúa, and Canindeyú, which comprised 84% of national soy production. It is no coincidence that these three regions are also the exact areas with the highest concentration of Brazilian immigrants.
The case of Brazilians in Paraguay is especially interesting when viewed in the context of the countries' immediate geographic proximity to each other. Most of the necessary equipment was purchased in Brazil, and most vehicles not only had Brazilian license plates, but were also registered in Brazil, meaning that their taxes were likewise paid in Brazil. (Kohlhepp 1999, 210) 21 (Fogel 1990, 47) 22 For more on the differences between cotton and soybean production, see: (Nagel 1991, 112-114) . him to uproot his family and return to Brazil, claiming that, 'Many say that we will have to cross the river again, if there comes another president.' (Ribeiro 1981, 6 ) Although Stroessner's regime did not fall until the end of the decade, the 1980s saw the slow reassertion of political freedoms. As Stroessner's grip on power gradually loosened, rural Paraguayan peasants began occupying properties and increasingly targeted Brasiguaios who were considered usurpers of lands that rightfully belonged to the peasantry.
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The fact that most Brasiguaios were small-scale farmers who suffered similar repression as Paraguayan peasants became almost irrelevant. Albuquerque (2010, 107) argues that along with being vilified for the privilege and wealth of a select few Brasiguaios, most Brazilian immigrants were seen as '"gringos" responsible for the pollution of rivers, deforestation, destruction of the soil and the drunkenness of teenagers and adults. (Albuquerque 2010, 231) 24 (Ribeiro 1981, 8) 25 (Kohlhepp 1999, 218) the Brazilian city of Cascavel and launched a campaign of land occupations, demanding a sweeping program of national agrarian reform. According to Cácia Cortêz (1994, 45) , it is was the emergence of the MST and the rise in its successful land occupations in the mid-to-late 1980s that signaled to marginalized Brasiguaios that it was time to return to Brazil. Whereas Paraguay did not return to democratic rule until the end of the decade, Brazil's military regime handed over power in 1985, adding further incentives for poor Brazilian immigrants in Paraguay to migrate back to their native lands.
The process of return migration, however, was far from simple. As mentioned in the discussion of the genesis of the term 'Brasiguaio,' these Brazilian immigrants often felt as though they no longer belonged to their home country and were greeted with acute animosity upon their return. Brasiguaios became stigmatized and were seen as dangerous outsiders by political authorities and the landed elite, who feared that the Brasiguaios would return in large numbers to threaten the established social order. (Albuquerque 2010, 229) The less-thanenthusiastic reception of returning Brasiguaios should be understand not as a markedly new phenomenon, but rather as a continuation of the inequalities that they already confronted for decades.
Toward a Redefined Border
When General Alfredo Stroessner fell from power in 1989, a huge wave of land occupations and peasant organizing spread throughout Paraguay. Taking advantage of the newly opened political landscape, these peasants asserted their own demands on a society that had long Although Brasiguaios were originally given their name in the context of being a people without a country-perceived essentially as a people adrift-over the course of nearly half a century they came to represent the physical and ideological dynamics of an entire region. Signifying both the wealth and the poverty generated by the settlement of eastern Paraguay, Brasiguaios were vehicles for the reorientation of borders and the blurring of national, ethnic, and class boundaries. As such, Brasiguaio communities have themselves become sites of inequality, embodying the complexities of immigrant enclaves and the processes that shape and redefine borderlands.
